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THE LAW OF DISBARMENT AND REINSTATEMENT
IN MARYLAND
ARTHUR W. MACHEN, JR.*
Bernard Meyerson, at the age of twenty-two, was admitted to the
bar of Maryland in 1936. In 1941 he and his father arranged an
abortion for a young woman whom Meyerson had been seeing for
five years. The midwife's surgical procedures were handled with
something less than professional skill, and the patient's life, thereby
jeopardized, was saved after a prolonged stay at Mercy Hospital.
Upon discharge, she complained to the State's Attorney, whereupon
the midwife, Meyerson, and his father were indicted for having
conspired to cause an illegal abortion.
At the trial, the woman changed the tone of her testimony so as
to exonerate Meyerson and blame the father and midwife. Neverthe-
less, all three were convicted. Following an unsuccessful appeal,'
Meyerson served two months of a six-month term. After his
conviction but before incarceration, he and the prosecuting witness
were married.
Meyerson had been classified 4-F in the draft during World War
II because of his criminal record and essential employment at a steel
plant. Nonetheless, determined to get into the army, he appealed to
the draft board, waived civil deferment, and finally achieved
induction. He served with distinction on the Italian front, rose to the
rank of staff sergeant, and received an honorable discharge. His
military efficiency was rated "superior," his character "excellent."
In December, 1944, the Governor of Maryland granted him a full
pardon.
Having been disbarred shortly after his conviction, he filed a
petition for reinstatement immediately upon his release from
* Partner, Venable, Baetjer and Howard, Baltimore, Md.; B.A. Princeton
University, 1942, LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1948. This paper was originally
delivered to The Lawyers Round Table on April 1, 1977.
1. Meyerson v. State, 181 Md. 105, 28 A.2d 833 (1942).
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military service.2 Meyerson testified that his marriage had been a
happy one and expressed moving contrition at the wrongs inflicted
on his wife.3 Several character witnesses also appeared on his
behalf, including the Mayor of Baltimore and Mr. Paul Wolman, a
former Assistant State's Attorney, National Commander of the
Veterans of Foreign Wars, and President of the Jewish Big Brother
League.4
The Supreme Bench denied reinstatement 5 and the Court of
Appeals affirmed.6 The three points on which the appellate decision
rests were that (1) the crime of abortion and conspiracy to commit it
could not be classified as among "the minor vices"; (2) the appellant
had not sustained his burden of proving "fitness"; and (3) Mrs.
Meyerson's testimony at the abortion conspiracy trial, only a few
days before her marriage to the appellant, was "perjured."
In the light of present day attitudes towards abortion, the
Meyerson result seems severe and can only be explained by the fact
that the court was disturbed by Meyerson's failure to testify in his
own behalf at his criminal trial,7 by the change in the testimony of
2. See In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948). Meyerson had been
convicted by the court, sitting without a jury, but the Supreme Bench was sharply
divided on post-conviction motions and on disbarment. The motion for new trial was
denied by an equally divided court as was also a motion for reargument. Of the judges
who heard the disbarment case, six voted for disbarment, two for "a year's
suspension," one for "a reasonable suspension" and one against disbarment without
suggesting any other sanction. Id. at 681-83, 59 A.2d at 493-94. The syllabus of the
Court of Appeals' opinion on Meyerson's reinstatement petition reported in the
Maryland Reports inaccurately states that nine of ten judges at the disbarment
proceeding had voted to disbar. Id. at 673.
3. Meyerson testified:
I felt that I had done my wife a grave injustice, of course, I have been very sorry
for it ever since, and I have tried my best to repent and make up for all the bad
things she has suffered as the result thereof, and I am happy to say that I believe
I have accomplished that; she is happy, she has two fine sons, and a very fine
home, and I am also happy.
190 Md. at 685, 59 A.2d at 495.
4. Mr. Wolman testified:
I base my opinion primarily on the fact that Mr. Meyerson's criminal acts were
those of a more or less personal nature, rather than acts that would be committed
while representing a client, or while representing a fiduciary agency, or even
while representing the court, and therefore he had wronged himself rather than
wronging a client who had placed trust and confidence in him.
Id.
5. The Supreme Bench was again divided. Of the eleven judges who heard the
reinstatement case, only seven signed the order, including all four of those who had
sat on the original disbarment case. No opinion was filed. See id. at 684, 59 A.2d at
494.
6. 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948) (Markell, J.).
7. Id. at 687, 59 A.2d at 496. Meyerson's admission of guilt in his plea for
reinstatement, coupled with his failure to testify in his defense at the criminal trial,
drew odious inferences in Judge Markell's opinion: "He had a constitutional right to
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the complaining witness, and by the unproven possibility that her
future husband had a part in making it "perjured."8 However that
may be, in jurisprudential perspective the significance of Meyerson
is that the Court of Appeals, in only the third case to reach it on the
subject of disbarment and reinstatement and the first where
substantial mitigating factors were present,9 adopted an uncom-
promising stance which has been subsequently applied with varying
degrees of consistency.
The object of this article is to analyze this field of Maryland law,
first by brief historical review establishing the reasons for its
relative novelty in a corpus of law that dates back to colonial times.
Then the opinions will be classified according to offenses, defenses,
and procedures, a technique designed to demonstrate both the
harmony and disharmony therein.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Procedural history
From time immemorial courts have asserted an inherent power
to discipline attorneys who appear before them.10 In Maryland until
1929, that power was vested exclusively in the circuit courts of the
counties and the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City without any right
of appeal whatsoever. After 1929, by act of the General Assembly the
right of appeal rested only in the attorney aggrieved;" if he received
a dismissal of the charges or a light sanction, the prosecuting bar
association had no power to contest the issue at the appellate level.
This history accounts for the fact that no disbarment cases appear
refrain from testifying; but he has no constitutional right to practice law." Query:
Would Judge Markell's court have ruled in Meyerson's favor had he pleaded guilty to
the criminal charge?
8. Id.
9. The first case was In re Williams, 180 Md. 689, reported in 23 A.2d 7 (1941),
and the second, Rheb v. Bar Ass'n, 186 Md. 200, 46 A.2d 289 (1946).
10. In H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 37 (1953), the leading authority on the subject
quoted the following statement from In re Samuel Davies, 93 Pa. 116, 121-22 (1880):
The court, by reason of the necessary and inherent power vested in it to
control the conduct of its own affairs ... and to maintain its own dignity, has a
summary jurisdiction to deal with the alleged misconduct of an attorney. A
proceeding for disbarment is simply the exercise of jurisdiction over an officer, an
inquiry into his conduct not for the purpose of granting redress to a client or other
person for wrong done, but only for the maintenance of the purity and dignity of
the court by removing an unfit officer.
For an interesting review of the Maryland background, see Comment,
Discipline of Attorneys in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REv. 236, 236-41 (1975).
11. 1929 Md. Laws, ch. 370, § 2. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Boone, 255 Md.
420, 423-29, 258 A.2d 438, 440-43 (1969); In re Brack, 187 Md. 407, 50 A.2d 432 (1946);
In re Williams, 180 Md. 689, reported in 23 A.2d 7, 11 (1941). See also State v.
19771
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in the Maryland Reports in the pre-1929 era, but why disbarred
attorneys failed to exercise their rights of appeal until 194112
remains a mystery. By statutory amendment effective in 193713 an
attorney denied reinstatement was first given the right of appeal.
Meyerson, decided in 1948, was the first case in which that right was
exercised.
Until 1929 the initiative to take disciplinary action was
exclusively a court function. The statutory amendments then
adopted additionally conferred the power to initiate disciplinary
action on the state and local bar associations, on the various state's
attorneys, and on any five volunteering members of the bar.14
Effective July 15, 1965 a new Subtitle BV was added to the
Maryland Rules of Procedure, formalizing for the first time in those
rules the procedures for disbarment cases.'5 Investigations and
complaints by bar associations were covered by Rule BV2; under
Rule BV3(a)16 the bar associations, acting through executive
councils, could initiate charges, as could any judge of any circuit
court, the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, the Court of Appeals,
or, still, any five volunteering attorneys. These rules were consistent
with the statutory provisions then regulating the discipline of
lawyers and set forth in Article 10 of the Annotated Code of
Maryland.
Revolutionary changes in the Rules of Procedure were made,
however, on October 13, 1970, the most significant of which is found
in the provision requiring charges thereafter to be filed, not with the
nisi prius courts, but exclusively in the Court of Appeals. 17 That
court would then refer the case to a three-judge panel of lower court
judges which, in turn, would make findings of facts, conclusions of
Johnston, 2 H. & McH. 160 (1786) (indicating that even in neo-colonial times no
appeal would lie from orders of admission, discipline, or reinstatement of attorneys).
In Character Committee v. Mandras, 233 Md. 285, 196 A.2d 630 (1964), the Court of
Appeals entertained an appeal by a local character committee which had been
overruled by the State Board of Law Examiners in approving an applicant for
admission to the bar. However, the rules of court specifically provided for such a right
of appeal.
12. State v. Johnston, 2 H. & McH. 160 (1786), is the only exception, but the result
of the case was a dismissal of the appeal with no consideration of substantive law.
13. 1937 Md. Laws, ch. 370, added a new § 12 to Article 10 of the Maryland- Code.
It was later codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 22 (Flack 1939).
14. 1929 Md. Laws, ch. 370, § 2 [creating eight new subsections in MD. ANN. CODE
art. 10, § 10 (Bagby Supp. 1929)].
15. Added July 12, 1965, effective July 15, 1965.
16. These rules have been amended and recodified. See text at notes 21 to 25 infra.
17. MD. R.P. BV 3(b) (1971) now codified at MD. R.P. BV 9(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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law, and recommendations as to sanction or dismissal.', Either the
accused attorney or the prosecuting bar association could file
exceptions to the panel's report, 19 a procedure similar to that used
when a Master in Chancery's report is presented to an equity judge.
Unlike the 1965 amendments above described, those adopted in
1970 establishing procedures by rule were wholly inconsistent with
the statutory ones then found in Article 10 of the Maryland Code
which continued to vest original jurisdiction in the nisi prius courts.
Fortunately, the 1977 General Assembly eliminated the inconsist-
ency by repealing the repugnant statutory provisions.20
The penultimate chapter in the procedural evolution of the
disciplinary law of the legal profession in Maryland occurred in 1975
with further amendments to the BV Rules.21 The prosecutorial
function was then removed from the bar associations, the lower
courts, and any five volunteering members of the bar, and vested
exclusively in an Attorney Grievance Commission, 22 supported by a
professional staff of attorneys and investigators under the supervi-
sion of a full-time Bar Counsel.23 Investigations were entrusted to
Inquiry Panels 24 subject to review by Review Boards, 25 and, for the
first time in Maryland history, the entire disciplinary process found
itself concentrated in one centralized court and the prosecutorial
function in one centralized agency.
B. Substantive history
Historically, the six statutory grounds for disbarment were (1)
professional misconduct, (2) malpractice, (3) fraud, (4) deceit, (5)
crime involving moral turpitude and (6) conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.2 6 Chief Justice Taney noted over a century
18. MD. R.P. BV 3(b), 4(c), 4(e), 5(a) (1971). The BV rules have since been amended
and reorganized. Under the present rules, the procedure for the filing of charges with
the Court of Appeals, reference to the three-judge lower court panel, and their
disposition of the charges are covered in MD. R.P. BV 9-11 (Cur. Supp. 1976).
19. MD. R.P. BV 5(b)(2) (1971), now codified at MD. R.P. BV 11(b)(2) (Cum. Supp.
1976).
20. See 1977 Md. Laws, ch. 305.
21. Some of the new procedures went into effect February 20, 1975 and others on
July 1, 1975.
22. MD. R.P. BV 2, 3.
23. MD. R.P. BV 4.
24. MD. R.P. BV 5.
25. Id.
26. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 12 (1976) [listing the same grounds as originally
set forth in the 1929 Code (see note 14 supra) as well as that of being a "subversive
person" (added by amendment of 1952 Md. Laws, ch. 27, § 2)]. H. DRiNKER, LEGAL
ETHics 42 (1953), classifies the grounds for discipline as:
1. Cases in which the lawyer's conduct has shown him to be one who cannot
properly be trusted to advise and act for his clients [and]
19771
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ago that in this litany of offenses, "the statute has done but little, if
anything, more than enact the general rules upon which the courts
of common law have always acted. ' 27
In analyzing these six grounds in Meyerson, Judge Markell
noted that the first two, professional misconduct and malpractice,
are tautological as well as the only ones necessarily relating to the
practice of law; the other four are personal offenses usually
committed outside such practice - although, of course, if committed
professionally they would also amount to "professional miscon-
duct. '28 Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice may
include any offense which impairs the basic objects of the
profession, as, for example, participation in a lynching, jury
tampering, or other form of interference with the judicial process.
Of the six standards, the one most difficult to construe is "crime
involving moral turpitude." The leading legal lexicographers, Black
2. Cases in which his conduct has been such that, to permit him to remain a
member of the profession and to appear in court, would cast a serious reflection on
the dignity of the court and on the reputation of the profession.
The members of many professions and occupations having no such direct
connection with the courts or other public institutions are nevertheless subject to
discipline for nonprofessional misconduct, presumably on the rationale that otherwise
the integrity of the remaining members would be tarnished. Thus, for example,
licenses are subject to revocation on conviction of a crime of moral turpitude in the
following areas of activity: architects [MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 524(a)(3) (Cum. Supp.
1976)]; physicians and surgeons [MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 130(h)(4) (Cum. Supp.
1976)]; dentists [MD. ANN. CODE art. 32, § 11(b) (1976)]; professional engineers and
surveyors [MD. ANN. CODE art. 75 , § 17(a)(3) (1975)]; osteopaths [MD. ANN. CODE art.
43, § 480(a) (1971)]; chiropractors [MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 506(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976)];
podiatrists [MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 490(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976)]; nurses [MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 299(a)(1 1) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (only if the crime of moral turpitude bears
directly on one's fitness to practice nursing)]; physical therapists [MD. ANN. C60E art.
43, § 609(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976)]; and last, but not least, funeral directors and
embalmers [MD. ANN. CODE art. 43 § 354(b) (1971)]. Cosmetologists may lose their
licenses if found guilty of "unprofessional, immoral or dishonest conduct." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 545(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976). The grounds for revoking the license of a
pharmacist are all related to the practice of the profession, except an adjudication as
an incompetent. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 266A(c)(1)-(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Accountants may be defrocked upon "[clonviction of a felony, or of any crime an
element of which is dishonesty or fraud." MD. ANN. CODE art. 75A, § 12(a)(4) (1975).
Presumably, therefore, a social crime such as bigamy, recognized as a felony but
having no bearing on an accountant's trustworthiness or capacity to practice his
profession, could be a ground for forfeiture of his license. In this connection, see the
case of Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898), upholding a statute authorizing the
revocation of a physician's license upon conviction of any felony.
Perhaps the time has come for the organized bar to determine whether it is
really "less concerned with keeping its house clean than with the pretense that it is
clean." Comment, The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures for the Misconduct of
Attorneys, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 1039, 1051 (1952).
27. Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 14 (1857), quoted in Rheb v. Bar Ass'n,
186 Md. 200, 203-04, 46 A.2d 289, 291 (1946).
28. 190 Md. at 676, 56 A.2d at 490-91. See note 26 supra.
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and Bouvier, define the term identically as "an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
man; ' 29 Manifestly, the infamous crimes of violence (murder, rape,
arson, burglary, armed robbery, etc.) fit this definition with no
difficulty, and at the other end of the spectrum, reckless driving,
parking violations, and spitting in the street do not. The problem, of
course, is in the gray area in between.
In Board of Dental Examiners v. Lazzell,30 the Maryland Court
of Appeals, after quoting Bouvier's Law Dictionary, analyzed a
number of cases in other jurisdictions equating some crimes with
moral turpitude, others not. There appears to be no rhyme or reason
by which these decisions can be harmonized, 31 except to say that if a
particular trier of law happens to find the conduct vile or depraved,
he will hold it one of "moral turpitude." Thus, in Lazzell, a dentist
who had thrice been convicted of indecent exposure was held to have
committed a crime of "moral turpitude" and thereupon expelled from
the profession of dentistry, Judge Sloan reasoning that "it requires
no discussion to argue or prove that the offense is so base, vile, and
shameful as to leave the offender not wanting in depravity, which
the words 'moral turpitude' imply. '32
Three other Maryland cases have attempted to pierce the gloom,
and all have left the darkness undisturbed. 33
In Rheb v. Bar Association34 the court held that the crime of
failing to file income tax returns was an offense "of such a character
as to justify disbarment" 35 without ruling flatly, as the syllabus
inaccurately states, that it is a crime of moral turpitude. While
indicating that such a crimen falsi is "generally recognized" as
falling in this category, Judge Henderson hedged with these words:
29. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (4th ed. 1951); BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY
2247 (Rawle's 3d rev. ed. 1914).
30. 172 Md. 314, 191 A.240 (1937) (reported in 191 A. sub nom. Brun v. Lazzell).
31. A catalogue of the divergent views would serve no useful purpose, a reference
to WORDS AND PHRASES being sufficient to make the point. Suffice it to say that, as
noted in Lazzell, 172 Md. at 321, 191 A. at 243, a violation of the National Prohibition
Act was held "in many jurisdictions" a crime of "moral turpitude." Happily, it was
never so held in the Free State of Maryland.
32. 172 Md. at 321, 191 A. at 244.
33. Professor Paul A. Freund, a luminary of the Harvard Law School whose
scholarship and sense of humor left an indelible impression on the author, was wont
to say, "This case has left the darkness unobscured."
34. 186 Md. 200, 46 A.2d 289 (1946).
35. Id. at 206, 46 A.2d at 291-92.
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"Such conduct might properly be characterized as fraud or deceit,
even if it did not involve moral turpitude." 36
The second case is In re Meyerson, discussed above,3 7 involving
conspiracy to commit abortion. Once more, the court did not rule
flatly that this was a crime of moral turpitude, although that result
is implicit from the fact that disbarment was ordered and the offense
committed did not fit within any of the other five statutory criteria.
The third case is Braverman v. Bar Association,38 involving
charges of subversion under the Smith Act,39 where Judge Dela-
plaine defined a crime of moral turpitude as grounds for disbarment
in these words:
The question whether a particular crime involves moral
turpitude within the meaning of the statute making such a crime
a ground for disbarment is to be determined by a consideration
of the nature of the offense as it bears upon the attorney's moral
fitness to continue in the practice of law.40
This pronouncement of Judge Delaplaine epitomizes the circular
reasoning that an offense must be held to be one of moral turpitude,
and, therefore, ground for discipline, if the court has independently
concluded that the respondent should be disciplined. Surely, a
statutory ground for imposition of a sanction or other remedy should
not thus be construed with reference to the court's predetermination
that the sanction or other remedy should be imposed.
Be that as it may, the Court of Appeals may have considerably
lightened its own burdens by adopting in 1970, as part of the
Maryland Rules of Procedure, the complete text of the Code of
Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association. 41 This
Code contains "Ethical Considerations," denominated as profes-
sional aspirations, the violation of which does not give rise to
disciplinary action, and "Disciplinary Rules" which do. DR 1-102,
36. Id. at 204, 46 A.2d at 291. However, compounding the confusion, the court
observed in Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 547, 318 A.2d 811, 813
(1974), that the equation of tax evasion with moral turpitude was "settled" in Rheb.
37. See text accompanying notes 1 to 9 supra.
38. 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 830 (1956).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970). [constitutionality upheld in Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), but subsequently restricted to narrow limits on first
amendment grounds; see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961)].
40. 209 Md. at 344-45, 121 A.2d at 481.
41. Approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on Aug.
12, 1969, to take effect on Jan. 1, 1970; effective as part of the Maryland Rules of
Procedure on Oct. 13, 1970.
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"Misconduct," is the crucial one for purposes of this study and reads
as follows: 42
DR 1-102 Misconduct.
A. A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of
another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law.
Manifestly, this Disciplinary Rule encompasses all six of the
statutory criteria discussed above: "professional misconduct" (DR 1-
102(A) (1)); "malpractice" (DR 1-102(A) (1));43 "fraud" (DR 1-102(A)
(4)); "deceit" (DR 1-102(A) (4)); "crime involving moral turpitude"
(DR 1-102(A) (3)); and "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice" (DR 1-102(A) (5)). Furthermore, the rule is broader than the
statute in three significant respects because it additionally pro-
scribes: (1) the circumvention of a Disciplinary Rule through the
actions of another; (2) any conduct involving dishonesty or
misrepresentation; and (3) any other conduct that adversely reflects
on the respondent's fitness to practice law. This codification of an
expanded spectrum of offenses should have a salutary effect on the
development of the law in the future for two reasons.
First, the court will no longer have to struggle with the task of
inserting into narrow statutory pigeonholes an attorney's conduct
which does not fit without a squeeze. Consider, for example, Judge
Henderson's difficulties in Rheb.44 Instead of contemplating whether
a failure to file income tax returns might be "fraud or deceit, even if
it did not involve moral turpitude, '45 he certainly could have held it
42. MARYLAND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102, published at
MD. R.P. 1007-08 (App. F).
43. This assumes (1) the validity of Judge Markell's observation in Meyerson that
"professional misconduct" and "malpractice" are tautological (see 190 Md. at 676, 59
A.2d at 490-91 and text accompanying note 28 supra), and (2) that to "violate a
Disciplinary Rule" includes both "professional misconduct" and "malpractice."
44. 186 Md. 200, 46 A.2d 289 (1946) (discussed at notes 34 to 36 supra).
45. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
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to be "conduct that adversely reflects on [the accused attorney's]
fitness to practice law," and, depending on extenuating circumstan-
ces in a particular case, such an offense could also constitute an act
of "dishonesty." But whether it is a crimen falsi constituting "fraud"
or "deceit" or per se an act so vile or depraved as to amount to moral
turpitude might have been a question better left to academic
discussion than an opinion of the Court of Appeals. Under the
present rule, it could be.
Secondly, the scope of the new Disciplinary Rule should enable
the court to fashion more consistent sanctions than those reflected in
the cases discussed below. Penalties range from reprimand, to short
suspension, long suspension, consignment to inactive status, and,
ultimately, the extreme sanction of disbarment.46 The offenses
catalogued in the new Disciplinary Rule run the gamut from conduct
adversely reflecting on a respondent's fitness as a lawyer to
dishonesty, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, professional miscon-
duct, and, ultimately, acts of vileness and depravity constituting
moral turpitude. The ends of justice demand a consistent correlation
between these varying degrees of culpability and sanctions of
comparable severity.
The thesis of this article is that in the preponderance of
decisions such correlation and consistency have been achieved, but
in a significant number they have not. Let us now test this thesis by
listening to the symphony and cacophony in the reported cases.
II. THE MARYLAND CASES
(1) Petty Crimes and Ethical Lapses
In Fellner v. Bar Association47 the Court of Appeals considered
the case of an attorney who fed slugs into a parking meter. After his
nolo contendere plea, he paid a fine of $250 and submitted to
disciplinary proceedings. Never testifying in his defense, he was
disbarred by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, the Court of
Appeals affirming. The court noted that disbarment proceedings are
not criminal in nature, there being, therefore, no constitutional right
to remain silent. Then, quoting from Meyerson, the court observed,
"No 'moral character qualification for Bar membership' is more
important than truthfulness and candor. '48
46. MD. R.P. BV 5(a).
47. 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957).
48. Id. at 247, 131 A.2d at 732 (quoting from Meyerson, 190 Md. at 687, 59 A.2d at
[VOL. 36
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It is difficult to criticize Feltner, because the attorney was guilty
of fraud, although probably prompted more by immature moral
judgment than by malevolence. However, it is impossible to reconcile
Feltner with the case of Prince George's County Bar Association v.
Vance.49 There, an attorney of twenty-five years' standing at the bar,
who had distinguished himself in military and civil service, entered
the active practice of law upon retirement. In order, however, to
continue to avail himself of post exchange privileges, he forged his
name to a set of military orders, reproduced the copy, and used it to
gain access to the PX. Upon apprehension, the United States
Attorney, refusing to prosecute, referred the matter to the bar
association. After a hearing before a three-judge panel, the attorney
was recommended for reprimand. On review, the sanction .was
increased to a ninety-day suspension.
Standing alone, either Fellner or Vance can be justified but the
two cannot stand together, since both attorneys were guilty of the
same offense of stealing nickles and dimes. In Vance the court
pointed to the respondent's "genuine contrition," distinguishing his
attitude from that of Fellner who "never admitted his guilt. '50 The
disparity between a ninety-day suspension and a disbarment for life
nonetheless seems difficult to reconcile, and, if "contrition" is
relevant, Vance cannot stand with Meyerson, the case of the
returning war veteran whose testimony at his reinstatement hearing
drips not only with "contrition" but pathos.5 1
Under this heading of "Petty Crimes and Ethical Lapses,"
mention must also be made of the recent case of Montgomery County
Bar Association v. Haupt,52 involving an attorney accused of taking
liberties with his sixteen-year old ward and engaging in frolics7 with
marijuana and hashish. The three-judge panel found those charges
49. 273 Md. 79, 327 A.2d 767 (1974).
50. Id. at 84, 327 A.2d at 770. Fellner had pleaded nolo contendere and was fined,
a sequence of events now recognized as conclusive proof of guilt for disciplinary
purposes under MD. R.P. BV 10(e)(1). Interestingly, however, the bar association in
Fellner conceded the reverse. 213 Md. at 246, 131 A.2d at 731.
51. See note 3 supra. On the subject of "contrition," the court observed in In re
Barton, 273 Md. 377, 382, 329 A.2d 102, 105 (1974):
However, to be reinstated, one need not express 'contrition' which is
inconsistent with a position to which he honestly and sincerely adheres. As stated
in Braverman [271 Md. 196, 202-203, 316 A.2d 246, 249 (1974)] "While [petitioner]
seems to hinder his cause by not taking what might be the easier way of
confession and contrition, the intellectual honesty of his position must be
recognized."
Unless the standards for imposing sanctions in a disciplinary case are congruent with
those to be applied in criminal sentencing, it is difficult to perceive the circumstances
under which contrition would have any relevance.
52. 277 Md. 326, 353 A.2d 629 (1976).-
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unproven but found the attorney guilty of another charge of
unprofessional conduct in dealing directly and abusively with an
opposing party known to be represented by counsel. The panel
having recommended a one-year suspension, the Court of Appeals
reduced the sanction to thirty days but filed no separate opinion
explaining the basis for the reduction. While the adoption on the
appellate level of-well-reasoned lower court panel opinions is to be
commended as a means of enhancing their dignity and reducing the
work load of the Court of Appeals, any change in a recommended
sanction without explanation does not lead to better understanding
of the law by the lower bench and bar.
Finally, there are several recent cases dealing with ethical
lapses resulting only in reprimands and one resulting in a short
suspension; they are noted but otherwise merit no special comment.53
(2) Medical Excuses
Maurice T. Siegel, an attorney of forty-five years' standing, was
disbarred by the. Court of Appeals in 1975 after pleading nolo
contendere to federal charges of tax evasion, an alleged crime of
moral turpitude.54 He had been previously tried and acquitted on
lottery charges. Many of the witnesses who had been discredited in
the lottery case were scheduled to testify against him in the tax case.
Two distinguished United States Attorneys, Stephen H. Sachs and
George Beall, recommended against prosecution of the tax charges
but were overruled by the Department of Justice. Sachs character-
ized the government case as "lousy. s5 5 Instead of the usual "net
worth plus expenditures" analysis, the government proposed an
untried method of proving the case by the testimony of a
Department of Labor economist to the effect that Siegel and his
family spent sums on "consumables" in amounts unreasonable in
53. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Leventhal, 279 Md. 350, 369 A.2d 72 (1977)
(a six-month suspension for accepting a fee with knowledge that the attorney had
already been discharged by the client); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Demyan, 278
Md. 240, 363 A.2d 966 (1976) (reprimand for the negligent handling of a client's funds
but no fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation); Prince George's County Bar
Ass'n v. Blanchard, 276 Md. 207, 345 A.2d 60 (1975) (reprimand where an attorney
charged clients for surveys but withheld part of the charge for himself without full
disclosure); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Robertson, 276 Md. 51, per curiam order
without opinion reported in 343 A.2d 529 (1975) (reprimand where a part-time attorney
improperly identified himself as a lawyer in a publication of his affiliated business, a
"peccadillo" regarded by the panel as more of a transgression of etiquette rather than
ethics).
54. Bar Ass'n v. Siegel, 275 Md. 521, 340 A.2d 710 (1975). Under MD. R.P. BV
10(e)(1), a nolo contendere plea when followed by imposition of a fine or sentence, is
deemed to be a "conviction."
55. 275 Md. at 531-32, 340 A.2d at 715-16 (Levine, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 36
DISBARMENT AND REINSTATEMENT
relation to reported income. This approach was considered "novel"
and raised doubts in the minds of the prosecutors as to its chances of
success.
56
Following Siegel's acquittal on the lottery charges but after his
indictment in the tax case, he suffered two massive heart attacks.
Advised by his physicians that a six-week trial in the tax case,
including two weeks of his own testimony, might prove fatal, Siegel
submitted a nolo contendere plea which was accepted by Judge
Miller of the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. In discharge of sentence, Siegel spent twenty-two days in
Allenwood Prison Camp.
In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, the three-judge panel
recommended to the Court of Appeals a one-year suspension, the bar
association joining therein. Nevertheless, a majority of the Court of
Appeals imposed the extreme penalty of disbarment, finding no
"compelling extenuating circumstances" justifying a lighter sanc-
tion and, further, that Mr. Siegel's health problems did not palliate
the evil proven by the nolo contendere plea and subsequent sentence.
Judge Levine dissented with the concurrence of Judges Singley and
Eldridge, pointing to the "Hobson's Choice" with which Siegel was
confronted - either risk his life in defending himself in the tax case
or face certain disbarment. 57 If this is not a case presenting
"compelling extenuating circumstances," Judge Levine had diffi-
culty in imagining a set of facts where such circumstances would
exist.
Without questioning the soundness of the general rule that
health problems developing after the offense cannot be considered as
excuses, the rule should be otherwise where those problems have had
a direct bearing on a decision to plead nolo contendere to a weak
criminal charge.
The result in Siegel seems even more unfair when compared with
that of Bar Association v. McCourt.58 There, the attorney had been
convicted of failing to file income tax returns, although the amount
of tax due was minuscule. The three-judge panel recommended a one-
year suspension, a sanction approved by the Court of Appeals over
the dissent of Judges Digges and Smith. In the panel's report
adopted by the appellate court, stress was laid on McCourt's medical
problems described by a psychiatrist as "neurotic ... disorder,
medically classifiable as a 'passive-aggressive personality ...
characterized in the patient by emotional immaturity and depend-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 533, 340 A.2d at 716-17.
58. 276 Md. 326, 347 A.2d 208 (1975).
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ency, procrastination and avoidance of unpleasant reality, hedonis-
tic pursuits and difficulty in handling hostile, rebellious and other
negative emotions.' 59
If, as the Court of Appeals has repeatedly said, the purpose of
disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the accused, as in a
criminal case, but to protect the public from those who have
demonstrated their unfitness, 60 one wonders whether an attorney
Who has been convicted of a serious crime and who suffers from a
neurosis that impairs his ability to cope is a person fit to practice
law.6 1
(3) Misappropriation or Misuse of Clients' Funds
Of the reported disciplinary decisions by far the largest number
fall under this category, and here we find no surprise and no
inconsistency - all nine attorneys were disbarred.6 2 A tenth63
escaped the extreme penalty because of a procedural foul-up more
fully explained in the next section captioned "The Ruffalo Barrier."
One case of particular interest is Bar Association v. Marshall,64
showing that in this area the court takes a consistently stern "no
nonsense" approach. There, the three-judge panel had recommended
a one-year suspension, but the Court of Appeals, although adopting
59. Id. at 330, 347 A.2d at 210.
60. Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 315-16, 329 A.2d 1, 6-7
(1974); Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533-35, 325 A.2d 718, 721
(1974); Anne Arundel County Bar Ass'n v. Collins, 272 Md. 578, 582-84,325 A.2d 724,
727-28 (1974); In re Lombard, 242 Md. 202, 207-.08, 218 A.2d 208, 211-12 (1966);
Fellner v. Bar Ass'n, 213 Md. 243, 247, 131 A.2d 729, 731-32 (1957); Braverman v. Bar
Ass'n, 209 Md. 328, 348-49, 121 A.2d 473, 483, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 830 (1956).
61. This point has previously drawn a perceptive and well considered barb to this
effect in Survey of Maryland Court of Appeals Decisions 1974-1975 - Attorney
Discipline, 36 MD. L. REv. 351, 370-71 (1976.
62. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Silk, 279 Md. 345, 369 A.2d 70 (1977) (of
particular interest because the funds were misappropriated from a club of which the
attorney was a treasurer, not from a client with whom he had a professional
relationship); Bar Ass'n v. Posner, 275 Md. 250, 339 A.2d 657, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1016 (1975); Bar Ass'n v. Snyder, 273 Md. 534, 331 A.2d 47 (1975); Bar Ass'n v.
Carruth, 271 Md. 720, 319 A.2d 532 (1974); In re Barton, 273 Md. 377, 329 A.2d 102
(1974); Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 307 A.2d 677 (1973); Balliet v. Baltimore
County Bar Ass'n, 259 Md. 474, 270 A.2d 465 (1970); In re Lombard, 242 Md. 202, 218
A.2d 208 (1966), In re Williams, 180 Md. 689, reported in 23 A.2d 7 (1941).
Most recently in Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Cooper, 279 Md. 605, 369
A.2d 1059 (1977), the attorney was found to have misappropriated clients' funds and
to have been generally neglectful. Because the attorney's misconduct had been due to
his severe alcoholism, the court, instead of disbarment, ordered him placed on
"inactive status." See text at note 122 infra.
63. See Bar Ass'n v. Cockrell, 274 Md. 279, 334 A.2d 85 (1975); text accompanying
notes 71 to 79 infra.
64. 269 Md. 510, 307 A.2d 677 (1973).
[VOL. 36716
DISBARMENT AND REINSTATEMENT
the panel's findings of fact, raised the sanction to disbarment, the
accused having been found guilty of violating DR 1-10265 and DR 9-
102.66 Speaking for a unanimous court, Judge Digges stressed the
seriousness of these violations in these ringing words:
It has been immemorially acknowledged that at the very heart
of the attorney-client relationship is the trust concept with the
attorney acting as a trustee for his client in all of his
undertakings for him... . The misappropriation by an attorney
of funds of others entrusted to his care, be the amount small or
large, is of great concern and represents the gravest form of
professional misconduct.6 7
(4) The Ruffalo Barrier
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of In re
Ruffalo 68 dealt with the case of an attorney, who in the course of
disciplinary proceedings against him, reveals information giving
rise to more serious additional disciplinary charges. There the Sixth
Circuit disbarred a lawyer, without granting a de novo hearing,
relying solely on an order of disbarment of the Ohio Supreme Court
following proof to that court's satisfaction of the attorney's
misconduct. The acts which formed the basis for the Ohio court's
decision were, however, not included in the original charges against
the attorney but were added at the disciplinary hearing as a result of
revelations there made by the accused lawyer.6 9 The Supreme
Court held that this procedure deprived the accused of due process
because there was no fair notice of the "precise nature of the
charges" against him. The Court reasoned:
The charge must be known before the proceedings com-
mence. They become a trap when, after they are underway, the
charges are amended on the basis of testimony of the accused.
He can then be given no opportunity to expunge the earlier
statements and start afresh.
How the charge would have been met had it originally been
included in those leveled . . . no one knows.70
This background brings into focus the strange Maryland case of
Bar Association v. Cockrell.71 The bar association had originally
65. Quoted in text at note 42 supra.
66. Quoted at note 73 infra.
67. 269 Md. at 519, 307 A.2d at 682.
68. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
69. Id. at 546-49.
70. Id. at 551.
71. 270 Md. 686, 313 A.2d 816 (1974) (remanding to a new three-judge panel), 274
Md. 279, 334 A.2d 85 (1975).
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filed its disbarment petition based on three alleged offenses: the
serious charges of inducing a client to defraud an insurance
company and paying "kickbacks" to an adjuster and the less serious
offense of advancing moneys to the client in excess of expenses of
litigation.7 2 In the course of the hearing before the three-judge panel,
however, it developed that the attorney might have also been guilty
of misappropriating another client's funds in violation of DR 9-102,
an offense described by Judge Digges as "the gravest form of
professional misconduct. ' 73 The Court of Appeals thereupon deferred
disposition of the original charges and remanded the case to a new
three-judge panel with instructions first to consider whether Ruffalo
barred a reconsideration and, if not, to recommend what further
action, if any, should be taken against the attorney accused. 74 The
second panel in a 2-1 vote held Ruffalo no barrier, the attorney's
conduct indefensible, and recommended disbarment.7 5
On review, the Court of Appeals scrupulously applied the
Ruffalo principle that an attorney's constitutional rights are violated
if he is forced to respond to charges emanating from facts disclosed
by him in his own defense to other charges. In Cockrell, the
72. MARYLAND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-103(B), published
at MD. R.P. 1025 (App. F), states:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his
client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation,
including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination,
and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains
ultimately liable for such expenses.
73. See text at note 67 supra. MARYLAND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 9-102, published at MD. R.P. 1038 (App. F), states:
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for
costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts
maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging
to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows: (1) Funds
reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited therein. (2) Funds
belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or
law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law
firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to
receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be
withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.
(B) A lawyer shall: (1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds,
securities, or other properties. (2) Identify and label securities and properties of a
client promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of
safekeeping as soon as practicable. (3) Maintain complete records of all funds,
securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the
lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his client regarding them. (4) Promptly
pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other
properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive.
74. 270 Md. 686, 313 A.2d 816 (1974).
75. See 274 Md. at 285-86, 334 A.2d at 88.
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prosecuting bar association came a cropper on this principle because
of the reintroduction before the second panel of the entire transcript
of the hearing before the first,7 6 including the "self-inculpatory
testimony" of the respondent.7 7 In an opinion by Judge Digges,
which must have pained him in the writing, the additional serious
charge of misappropriation was dismissed and the attorney
suspended for six months on the relatively minor charge of
advancing funds to a client in excess of permissible disbursements.
One wonders what the result would have been if, instead of
introducing in the second hearing the transcript from the first
hearing, there had been a complete trial de novo the second time
around.7 8 In future cases to be tried by the Bar Counsel, it is hoped
that this approach will be used. Otherwise, Ruffalo will be a serious
impediment to the regulation of decency in the profession of law. An
attorney could be charged with trivial unprofessional practice and,
in the process of defending himself, admit with impunity that he had
misappropriated his client's funds or committed other acts of
dishonesty.7 9 If the Ruffalo rule is that such admissions cannot be
used against him in disciplinary proceedings, then the law is, as
Charles Dickens put it, "a ass."*
(5) Tax Evasion
There have been five disciplinary cases involving tax evasion or
aiding and abetting it, and each has resulted in disbarment: Bar
Association v. Siegel,0 Maryland State Bar Association v. Agnew, 8'
Maryland State Bar Association v. Callanan,8 2 Maryland State Bar
76. The Court of Appeals based its reasoning on the language from the Supreme
Court's opinion in In re Ruffalo quoted in text at note 70 supra. 274 Md. at 285, 334
A.2d at 88.
77. 274 Md. at 286-87, 334 A.2d at 89.
78. One also wonders why the court did not remand Cockrell to still a third panel,
with directions to reconsider without use of the "self-inculpatory testimony" of the
respondent which apparently caused the difficulty in the second reconsideration.
79. Judge Digges raises this point in Cockrell, noting that because of this
"crippling effect" of Ruffalo, several courts have resorted to "ingenious reasoning" to
avoid its result. 274 Md. at 286, n.3, 334 A.2d at 89, n.3, (citing Black v. State Bar, 7
Cal. 3d 676, 499 P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1972); In re Gartland, 47 Ill. 2d 177, 265
N.E.2d 148 (1970); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Jacques, 260 La. 803, 257 So. 2d 413,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972)).
In Bar Ass'n v. Hirsch, 274 Md. 368, 374, 335 A.2d 108, 112, cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1012 (1975), decided shortly after Cockrell, the court observed that "Ruffalo did
no more than extend to the challenged attorney the rights of procedural due process,
including fair notice of the charges against him."
* For a discussion of two later cases in which Ruffalo was applied, see
Addendum, infra, at 730.
80. 275 Md. 521, 340 A.2d 710 (1975).
81. 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974).
82. 271 Md. 554, 318 A.2d 809 (1974).
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Association v. Sugarman,8 3 and Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Swerdloff.84 The Siegel case has been reviewed above and Callanan
was an open-and-shut case following conviction. Accordingly, only
Agnew and Sugarman merit further comment.
Agnew is, of course, a landmark decision because it involved the
first disbarment of a former Vice President of the United States. The
case reaffirms that (1) the acceptance of a nolo contendere plea
followed by imposition of a fine constitutes a final judgment
conclusively establishing proof of the commission of a crime; (2)
willful tax evasion, as "settled in Rheb," is a crime of moral
turpitude; and (3) in the absence of compelling extenuating
circumstances disbarment must follow as a matter of course. Judge
Digges expressed the court's revulsion at Mr. Agnew's conduct as
follows:
It is difficult to feel compassion for an attorney who is so
morally obtuse that he consciously cheats for his own pecuniary
gain that government he has sworn to serve, completely
disregards the words of the oath he uttered when first admitted
to the bar, and absolutely fails to perceive his professional duty
to act honestly in all matters.8 5
Sugarman is a particularly interesting case because disbarment
resulted from disclosures made by the attorney himself while
testifying as a witness in a criminal case86 under compulsion and
grant of immunity87 after having asserted his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 88 The compelled testimony
revealed that the attorney had aided and abetted his client in tax
evasion. The Court of Appeals upheld the use of this testimony in the
disbarment case, noting that to rule otherwise would be to delegate
to the federal prosecutor the power to determine when disciplinary
proceedings should be initiated. 89 The "use immunity" granted by
83. 273 Md. 306, 329 A.2d 1 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975).
84. 279 Md. 296, 369 A.2d 75 (1977).
85. 271 Md. at 552, 318 A.2d at 816.
86. The trial was United States v. Anderson, 368 F. Supp. 1253 (D. Md. 1973),
aff'd, 506 F.2d 1398 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975).
87. 18 U.S.C. §6002 (1970).
88. Accord In re Daley, 45 U.S.L.W. 2409 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 1977); Florida Bar v.
Massfeller, 170 So. 2d 834 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1964); In re Schwartz, 51 Ill. 2d 334, 282
N.E.2d 689, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Graziani,
200 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).
But see Lurie v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1974) (holding that immunized testimony could not be used in licensing proceedings
involving the profession of dentistry).
89. 273 Md. at 318, 329 A.2d at 7.
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the statute9 being co-extensive with the fifth amendment privilege,
the witness is absolutely protected against the infliction of any
criminal penalties resulting from his compelled testimony. However,
the court reasoned that there is no barrier to the use of such
testimony in disbarment proceedings since they are not criminal in
nature and any sanctions imposed are not penalties. 91
Sugarman had rested his hopes on the controversial Supreme
Court case of Spevack v. Klein.92 There, a New York lawyer had
invoked his fifth amendment privilege in refusing to testify or to
honor a subpoena duces tecum issued in connection with a judicial
inquiry into his own conduct. The Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court ordered him disbarred and the New York Court
of Appeals affirmed. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the New
York result was reversed.
Confusion abounds as to the law of Spevack. The plurality
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas (Warren, Black and Brennan, J.J.,
joining) reasoned in rhetorical terms that a threat of disbarment,
being a powerful form of compulsion, cannot be used to coerce a
waiver of fifth amendment rights, that the privilege against self-
incrimination is available to all citizens without distinction, and
that "lawyers also enjoy first-class citizenship. ' ' 93 The concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas half-heartedly agreed, noting, however,
that the result should be otherwise if a lawyer were a state employee
who is asked specific questions about the performance of his official
duties. 94 The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, a model of
clarity, asserted that the attorney's claim of privilege is no
admission of guilt and that the majority holding will encourage
future generations of lawyers to think of their calling as imposing no
90. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the constitutionality of the
"use and derivative use" immunity granted by the statute (note 87 supra), as
distinguished from a "transactional immunity," was upheld. Mr. Justice Douglas was
an avowed partisan of "transactional immunity." See 406 U.S. at 462 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
91. 273 Md. at 318, 329 A.2d at 7. The same reasoning was used by the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland in refusing to enjoin disciplinary
proceedings against engineers who had similarly testified at the Anderson trial (supra
note 86) under compulsion and grant of immunity. Childs v. McCord, 420 F. Supp. 428,
434 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd, No. 76-2417 (4th Cir. June 22, 1977).
92. 385 U.S. 511 (1967). A companion case, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967), had ruled that policemen, having been warned that unless they testified during
a state investigation concerning police corruption they could be dismissed, were
thereby deprived of their fifth and fourteenth amendment rights in being subjected to
criminal charges based on their testimony thus threateningly induced. See also
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Sanitation
Comm'r, 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
93. 385 U.S. at 516.
94. Id. at 519-20 (Fortas, J., concurring).
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higher standards "than might be acceptable in the general market-
place. 95 Finally, the concurring dissent of Mr. Justice White
cogently observed that, since a threat of anyone's discharge from
employment (necessarily including the disbarment of a lawyer),
renders inadmissible in a subsequent criminal case the testimony so
induced, 96 the majority result in Spevack has "little legal or practical
basis, in terms of the privilege against self-incrimination protected
by the Fifth Amendment. ' 9 7 Spevack had "incriminated himself in
no way whatsoever." 98 The Douglas and Fortas opinions do agree
that the fifth amendment privilege has been incorporated in the
fourteenth, and is, therefore, applicable to the states, 99 but beyond
that there is no consistent reasoning pointing the way to the law of
the case.
The controversy -over the significance of Spevack has been
exhaustively explored by many commentators'"0 and its relevance to
Sugarman extensively examined in Survey of Maryland Court of
Appeals Decisions 1974-1975 - Attorney Discipline.'0 No useful
purpose would be served by repeating these analyses. Suffice it to
say that although the two cases produced different results in that
Spevack's disbarment was reversed and Sugarman's allowed to
stand, the narrow holdings in the two cases are not in conflict if one
accepts the premise that disciplinary proceedings are not criminal or
quasi-criminal in nature. The courts consistently accept this premise
as an established principle, while disbarred attorneys whose
sanction may appear far more serious to them than a stiff criminal
fine, understandably regard it as pure fiction.
(6) Failure to File
Only two cases have reached the Court of Appeals involving
attorneys who had failed to file income tax returns, Rheb v. Bar
95. Id. at 521 (Harlan, Clark, Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
96. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
97. Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id., at 514 (Douglas, J.); id. at 519 (Fortas, J., concurring). The plurality and
concurring opinions confirm that Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963), effectively
incorporated in the fourteenth amendment the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, and that Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), to the contrary, should
be considered overruled.
100. See Buchanan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: To What Extent
Should It Protect a State Employee or Professional Licensee Against the Loss of His
State-Created Status?, 7 Hous. L. Rv. 297 (1970); Franck, The Myth of Spevack v.
Klein, 54 A.B.A.J. 970 (1968); Niles & Kaye, Spevack v. Klein: Milestone or Millstone
in Bar Discipline?, 53 A.B.A.J. 1121 (1967).
101. Survey of Maryland Court of Appeals Decisions 1974-1975 - Attorney
Discipline, 36 MD. L REV. 351, 351-64 (1976).
722 [VOL. 36
DISBARMENT AND REINSTATEMENT
Association10 2 and Bar Association v. McCourt.103 Although
McCourt received a one-year suspension whereas Rheb was dis-
barred, the bar association's case against Rheb was belatedly
bolstered by charges of a stock swindle, thus introducing an element
of out-and-out fraud clearly justifying disbarment. Despite the
distinction, the leniency accorded McCourt remains a mystery which
has drawn prior critical comment. 04
The paucity of decisions in "failure to file" cases is surprising
since within recent memory the press has reported more than two
attorneys who have entered guilty or nolo contendere pleas to this
charge. Some may have submitted resignations which were accepted
sub silento; others may have been suspended or disbarred at the
circuit court or Supreme Bench levels without appeal, thus leaving
no practical access to the record for those interested in tracing the
development of the law in this field. Still others may have escaped
public notice altogether if those heretofore vested under Article 10 of
the Annotated Code of Maryland with the statutory initiative to
prosecute elected to take no action. Now that grievance procedures
have been centralized in the Attorney Grievance Commission and
original jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Appeals in the BV
Rules, it is to be hoped that a more uniform standard of prosecution
will evolve in this sensitive area. A lawyer who is convicted or who
pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a charge offailing to file income
tax returns should be required to account for his conduct on the
public record. Any other standard subverts confidence in a learned
profession which must, in the public interest, remain free from all
suspicion.*
(7) Perjury, Bribery and Miscellaneous Crimes
A number of decisions fall in this catch-all group, all of them
calling for disbarment: Maryland State Bar Association v. Frank
(bribery),10 5 Anne Arundel County Bar Association v. Collins
(bribery),0 6 Maryland State Bar Association v. Hirsch0 7 (bribery),
Maryland State Bar Association v. Rosenberg°. (perjury), Maryland
State Bar Association v. Green'0 9 (perjury), Maryland State Bar
102. 186 Md. 200, 46 A.2d 289 (1946).
103. 276 Md. 326, 347 A.2d 208 (1975).
104. Survey of Maryland Court of Appeals Decisions 1974-1975 - Attorney
Discipline, 36 MD. L. REv. 351, 371 (1976).
* See Addendum, infra, at 730, for a discussion of Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Wallman, BV No. 17 (Ct. App., filed June 9, 1977).
105. 272 Md. 528, 325 A.2d 718 (1974).
106. 272 Md. 578, 325 A.2d 724 (1974).
107. 274 Md. 368, 335 A.2d 108, cert. denied, 422 U.S.,1012 (1975).
108. 273 Md. 351, 329 A.2d 106 (1974).
109. 278 Md. 412, 365 A.2d 39 (1976).
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Association v. Boone".0 (mail fraud), Maryland State Bar Associa-
tion v. Kerr"' (mail fraud), Klupt v. Bar Association"2 (misrepresen-
tation to the client and the court, coupled with excessive fees without
the client's understanding or consent), and Braverman v. Bar
Association"3 (subversion under the Smith Act). Braverman's
conviction was a product of the anti-Communist hysteria of the
1950's, and he was later reinstated as mentioned more fully below." 4
The only other case in this category which merits comment is Frank.
That case is of interest because the accused had been acquitted
of the charges for which he was disbarred, i.e., attempted bribery of
an Assistant State's Attorney to induce lenient treatment of his
clients. The disciplinary proceedings, not being of a criminal nature,
were held not barred by the prior acquittal and to present no problem
of double jeopardy. 15 .The basis of the disciplinary action was not
the commission of a crime but unprofessional conduct flagrantly
prejudicial to the administration of justice. On these facts, disbar-
ment was held not too severe a sanction.
Once more, as in. Sugarman, we are confronted with a conflict
between the interest of the court in policing the profession of law
and, on the other hand, the personal rights of the accused attorney.
In both cases the broader public interest prevailed, a result that will
hopefully survive future constitutional attack.*
(8) Neglect of Duty
There are four Maryland cases in which disciplinary action was
taken against attorneys for neglect of duty in violation of DR 6-
101,116 Bar Association v. Dearing,"7 Maryland State Bar Associa-
tion v. Phoebus,"8 and the two recent cases of Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Cooper and Attorney Grievance Commission v.
Pollack"9
110. 255 Md. 420, 258 A.2d 438 (1969) (denial of reinstatement after resignation).
111. 272 Md. 687, 326 A.2d 180 (1974).
112. 197 Md. 659, 80 A:2d 912 (1951).
113. 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 830 (1956).
114. See text at notes 131 to 133 infra.
115. 272 Md. at 535-36, 325 A.2d at 722-23.
* See Addendum, infra, at 731, for a discussion of Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Brewster, BV No. 7 (Ct." App., filed June 21, 1977).
116. MARYLAND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY, DR 6-101, published at
MD R.P. 1026-27 (App. F),. states:
(A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should
know that he is not.competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer
who is competent to handle it. (2) Handle a legal matter without preparation
adequate in the circumstances. (3) Neglect a matter entrusted to him.
117. 274 Md. 66, 332 A.2d 649 (1975).
118. 276 Md. 353, 347 A.2d 556 (1975).
119. Cooper is reported: in 279 Md. 605, 369 A.2d 1059 (1977), and Pollack is
reported in 279 Md. 225, 369 A.2d 61 (1977).
[VOL. 36
DISBARMENT AND REINSTATEMENT
The reported decision in Dearing consists only of the Order of
Court from which the details of the attorney's conduct cannot be
gleaned. The evidence, however, was said to be-sufficient to support
the charge that he had become involved in cases which he should
have known he was incompetent to handle, that in others he failed
adequately to prepare himself, and that he neglected a number of
legal matters entrusted to him. The three-judge panel recommended
a one-year suspension, but on review by the Court of Appeals the
sanction was increased to two years. A special master was appointed
to investigate the attorney's files and ascertain that his clients had
been provided with proper representation. 120
In Phoebus the neglectful attorney was disbarred. He had given
incorrect advice to a client involved in a tax sale, had failed to
dissolve a corporation when instructed to do so, and had misman-
aged three decedents' estates. These charges represented the third
disciplinary action against him; he had been suspended after
pleading nolo contendere on a charge of failing to file income tax
returns and again suspended for having made misrepresentations to
a client. Because of his "persistent neglect" and "fixed and
irreversible habit of dilatoriness,"'1 21 the court concluded that the
public should be protected from his unfitness to practice law.
In Cooper an attorney was charged with incompetence in
handling a real estate settlement and in administering an estate, as
well as misappropriation of a client's funds. The three-judge panel
found that the respondent's acute alcoholism was a material
contributor to the causes of his misconduct and recommended that
he be placed indefinitely on inactive status pursuant to Rule BV
(11)(2).122 This recommendation was adopted by the Court of
Appeals.
In Pollack the Court of Appeals accepted the recommendation of
a three-judge panel for disbarment of an attorney who had been
persistently neglectful and dilatory in three separate matters, whose
120. In Andresen v. Bar Ass'n, 269 Md. 313, 305 A.2d 845 (1973), the Court of
Appeals granted a local bar association's petition for an audit of an attorney's
accounts in real estate transactions which he was alleged to have mishandled.
Andresen has become the subject of disciplinary proceedings as a result of his
conviction for receiving money under false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion by a fiduciary. [(Conviction upheld in Andresen v. State, 24 Md. App. 128, 331
A.2d 78, cert. denied, 274 Md. 725 (1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976)]. Pursuant to MD.
R.P. BV 16, the Court of Appeals suspended Andresen from the practice of law, with
the ultimate disciplinary action to be taken upon his release from incarceration. See
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Andresen, 279 Md. 250, 367 A.2d 1251 (1977).
121. 276 Md. at 365-66, 347 A.2d at 563.
122. Compare the treatment of Cooper, whose illness was taken into consideration
in the sanctioning decision, with that of Siegel and McCourt, discussed in text at
notes 54 to 61 supra.
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emotional and marital difficulties were held to be no excuse, and
who was lacking in candor in his testimony before the panel. The
decision is consistent with others brought under DR 6-101; they
clearly establish the point that professional incompetence is
professionally unethical.
(9) Reinstatement
Four decisions of the Court of Appeals have considered the
question of reinstatement after previous disbarment: In re Meyer-
son,123 In re Braverman,124 Maryland State Bar Association v.
Boone 25 and In re Barton.126 The Meyerson case, involving the
returning war veteran who was denied reinstatement because of his
participation in obtaining an illegal abortion for a young woman to
whom he was shortly thereafter married, has already been
considered in extenso above;127 and passing mention has been made
of Barton, the case of an attorney denied reinstatement after
disbarment for commingling clients' funds. 28 The cases of Boone
and Braverman, however, require discussion.
A. Gordon Boone, admitted to the Bar of Maryland in 1937, was
convicted in 1964 of mail fraud and his resignation from the bar
thereupon was accepted by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
After serving thirteen months in prison, he applied for gubernatorial
pardon which was denied. In 1969 he petitioned for reinstatement in
the same circuit court, and, after a hearing at which the Baltimore
County Bar Association expressed passive acquiescence, he was
ordered reinstated over the dissent of Judge Kenneth C. Proctor.
Thereupon, the Maryland State Bar Association appealed to the
Court of Appeals (even though that association had not been a party
to the lower court proceedings) and simultaneously filed motions in
the circuit court for intervention, a new trial, a rehearing, and
vacation of the order of reinstatement! In a remarkable piece of
jurisprudential legerdemain, the Court of Appeals heard the
association's "appeal," even though it was dismissed as clearly
123. 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948) (application denied).
124. 271 Md. 196, 316 A.2d 246 (1974) [application granted; referral to three-judge
panel reported in 269 Md. 661, 309 A.2d 468 (1973)]. Respondent's disbarment had
been affirmed in Braverman v. Bar Ass'n, 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473, cert. denied, 352
U.S. 830 (1956). He was disbarred from the federal court in 148 F. Supp. 56 (D. Md.
1957); his application for reinstatement was denied in 399 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1975);
but he was ordered reinstated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
549 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1976).
125. 255 Md. 420, 258 A.2d 438 (1969).
126. 273 Md. 377, 329 A.2d 102 (1974).
127. See text accompanying notes 1 to 9 supra.
128. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
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required by the authorities. 129 In an opinion by Chief Judge
Hammond, the association's dismissed appeal was treated as a
"motion for review" resulting in a direction to the circuit court to
conduct a new hearing at which both the association and Mr. Boone
would have the right to present testimony. Members of the circuit
court who had professional, personal, or social contacts with Mr.
Boone were directed to disqualify themselves "and not sit."130 The
principles laid down in Meyerson governing reinstatement of
disbarred attorneys were ordered strictly observed.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted within its constitu-
tional authority in Boone is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it
to say that, in cases not reviewable by the Supreme Court, the
Maryland Court of Appeals stands on parity with the Bishop of
Rome speaking ex cathedra on ecclesiastical matters, there being no
one below the rank of God Almighty to gainsay its decisions.
However, there are few concerned with public confidence in the
administration of justice who would say that the result, however
strained the methods of attainment, was not in the public interest.
Having opened with a discussion of Meyerson, the case of the
young man denied reinstatement because of his complicity in an
illegal abortion, it is fitting to close with a discussion of Braverman,
the case of an attorney convicted in 1952 of conspiracy to overthrow
the government of the United States by force or violence in violation
of Section 2 of the Smith Act.131 Braverman was subsequently
disbarred both from state and federal practice, and after serving his
three-year sentence, he devoted himself to pro bono publico pursuits
of commendable proportions. Having renounced association with the
Communist Party, he established a bookkeeping service for small
businesses, became treasurer of the New Democratic Coalition,
served as president of the St. John's Council on Criminal Justice,
and taught courses on poverty and criminal justice at the Baltimore
Free University on the Johns Hopkins campus.132 His reinstatement
was recommended by the Maryland State Bar Association and
129. See cases cited at note 11 supra.
130. In the argument on its dismissed "appeal," the Maryland State Bar
Association
took the position that it was improper, if not a vitiation of the court's right to act,
for certain members of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County who are or had
been in very close association with Boone - politically, economically, socially or
in the practice of law - to have sat in the case.
255 Md. at 424-25, 258 A.2d at 440.
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
132. By contrast, the petitioner in Barton, 273 Md. 377, 329 A.2d 102 (1974) (see
notes 46, 57, & 102 supra), an applicant who had been disbarred for misappropriation
of a client's funds and denied reinstatement, laid claim to pro bono publico service of
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endorsed by the three-judge. panel. The. Court of Appeals con-
curred. 133
The three factors bearing on eligibility for reinstatement as laid
down by Judge Markell in Meyerson and repeated in the other three
cases are: the nature of the original offense, the rehabilitation of the
respondent, and his present capacity to practice law. In three of the
four reinstatement cases, these tests may be said to have been
applied harmoniously, the exception, oddly enough, being Meyerson,
where the tests were fashioned. There, an offense characterized as
"not among the minor vices" should not have been equated with one
of moral turpitude, since it involved no element of violence or
deliberate dishonesty,. It was rather, as Mr. Wolman testified, a
personal offense, inflicting injury on Meyerson himself, a wrongdo-
ing that imperiled his relationship with a young woman to whom he
was later happily married. His army service and statement of
contrition being ample evidence of rehabilitation, and his capacity to
practice law being unquestioned, he should, like Braverman, have
been reinstated.
CONCLUSION
The BV amendments to the Maryland Rules of Procedure in 1970
represented giant steps forward in the cause of better professional
responsibility by the bar of Maryland, their most important facet
being the transfer of original jurisdiction in disciplinary cases from
the nisi prius courts to the Court of Appeals. Prior to that time, the
system itself fostered cronyism between respondents and those
holding the power to initiate proceedings, failed to produce uniform
statewide standards of enforcement, and was usually lacking in a
centralized published-record for the guidance of the local bench and
bar. Only in the relatively rare case of an appeal to the Court of
Appeals by an aggrieved attorney would statewide members of the
profession, the press, and the public become aware of actions taken
by the bar to police its own. 34
A second giant -step occurred in 1975 in the creation of the
Attorney Grievance. Commission and Bar Counsel with their
specialized staffs of attorneys and investigators. It is still too early
to assess how well the new system will work, but the concept is
more modest proportions. The court observed that "he had done some volunteer-work
of a clerical nature for a family court and a legal aid agency, and ... had subscribed
to the Daily Record for two years.". Id. at 382, 329 A.2d at 1,05. Clearly not enough.
133. See note 124 supra.
134. Under the new procedure, disbarments by consent do not appear -in the
Maryland Reports but a public record remains in the Maryland Register.
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plainly designed to overcome some of the more obvious shortcomings
in the old, such as the burden on private attorneys in serving as pro
bono publico prosecutors and the lack of adequate staff for
investigative purposes
However, more remains to be done, particularly in the following
three areas:
(1) Now that the Court of Appeals has become the court of first
and last resort in disciplinary actions, it finds itself burdened with
one of the most difficult tasks of nisi prius judges, the imposition of
consistent "sentences" making the "punishment" fit the "crime". It
is hoped that this analysis of the cases has shown that in the
majority of its decisions in this field the court has demonstrated
commendable consistency, but in a substantial number it has not.
(2) The referral to the three-judge panels is a healthy develop-
ment, as is also the increasing tendency of the Court of Appeals to
adopt well reasoned panel opinions as the law of the case. But
whenever there is a change in the sanction at the appellate level, a
complete explanation is the only way to enlighten the lower bench
and bar. Absent such explanation, they remain confused. 13 5
(3) Whenever a difficult case presents a superficial reason
which does not justify the extreme penalty of disbarment and an
underlying one which does, public confidence in the administration
of justice would be enhanced if the court were to place exclusive
reliance on the latter. This brings us back to Meyerson where this
inquiry began: if the real reason why the returning war veteran was
denied reinstatement was the court's belief that he had suborned his
wife's so-called, but unproven, "perjury" in the abortion case, then
the court should have said so.
The problems of disbarment and reinstatement will remain with
us so long as we have a profession of law populated by human
beings with the shortcomings in moral fiber with which we are all,
in varying degrees, afflicted. The solutions will:evolve, case by case,
with the passage of time as they have so dramatically in Maryland
over the last thirty years, and especially in the last seven. This study
will close, therefore, not with any definitive answers to the questions
135. In March of 1977, the Attorney Grievance Commission, pursuant to Md. R.P.
BV16, sought the suspension, subject to further order of the court, of an attorney who
had been convicted of mail fraud. Without filing any explanatory opinion, the Court
of Appeals denied the petition. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Reamer, BV No. 12
(Md. filed Apr. 15, 1977). The respondent had challenged the constitutionality of the
rule which permits a summary suspension of an attorney on conviction of a crime of
moral turpitude, regardless of the pendency of an appeal. As in Haupt, discussed in
text at note 52, supra, the absence of an opinion explaining the action taken raises
serious doubts that should have been put to rest. The uncertainty raised by Reamer is
compounded by the recent invocation of Md. R.P. BV 16 in Andresen, supra note 120,




that will confront future generations but with a restatement of the
age-old question propounded by Lord Mansfield many years ago:
"The question is, whether, after the conduct of this man, it is
proper that he should continue a member of a profession which
should stand free from all suspicion."
ADDENDUM
After the foregoing article had gone to press, the Court of
Appeals took action in two cases which must be noted in this
Addendum. By asterisk, they have been appropriately flagged in the
text of the article and are summarized below:
(1) In Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Wall-
man,136 an attorney who had pleaded guilty to a charge of failing to
file federal income tax returns was held, in a 4 to 3 decision, not to
have committed a crime of moral turpitude under DR 1-102(A)(3) but
to have engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice violating subsection (5) of the rule and conduct adversely
reflecting on his fitness to practice law under subsection (6). The
three-judge panel had recommended a one-year suspension which
the Court of Appeals increased to three years. The court's analysis of
"moral turpitude" is defensible, although debatable, and the
sanction imposed appears reasonable, but scarcely compatible with
McCourt. 137 Instead of distinguishing that case on grounds that the
respondent there had suffered from "'passive-aggressive' neurotic
personality disorder," it would have been better if McCourt had been
characterized as an aberration of excess leniency - which it was.
The Walman case is of particular interest, however, because of
the majority holding that under Ruffalo 3 and Cockrell,139 the court
was powerless to take into account in imposing sanctions the fact
that the respondent had failed to file Maryland income tax returns
for a decade. The point had not been mentioned in the disciplinary
charge but was brought out for the first time on cross-examination
before the three-judge panel. Relying on Ruffalo and its requirement
of procedural due process in disciplinary cases, four of the seven
judges found their hands helplessly tied.
A sharp dissent was registered by Judge Murphy, with the
concurrence of Judges Digges and Smith. The Chief Judge argued
136. BV No. 17 (Ct. App., filed June 9, 1977).
137. See discussion, supra, at 715-16.




that although a failure to file federal income tax returns is not a per
se crime of moral turpitude, it can be so if the respondent is
motivated not just by his inability to pay' but by a fraudulent intent
never to make any payment at all. Such he believed to be Wallman's
intent from the record in this case. On the questions of procedural
due process involved in the belated revelation of respondent's failure
to file Maryland returns, Judge Murphy reasoned convincingly that
Cockrell should be confined to its particular facts and that, unless
Ruffalo is to have a crippling effect on disciplinary proceedings, the
import of its holding must be narrowly circumscribed. Judge Smith's
separate dissent noted that respondent had demonstrated his
unfitness to practice law and should on this account be disbarred.
The other two dissenters agreed.
(2) In Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Brew-
ster,140 Judge Smith, a dissenter in Waltman but now speaking for a
6-1 majority, held that a former elected official who had pleaded nolo
contendere to a charge of accepting an illegal gratuity was not guilty
of a crime of moral turpitude and that since this was the only charge
placed against him by the Commission, the petition for disciplinary
action must be dismissed. Again, reliance was placed on Ruffalo and
Cockrell and again Chief Judge Murphy dissented. While agreeing
that the offense was not one of moral turpitude under DR 1-102(A)(3),
he saw no reason why, on the record of the case, the respondent
should not be held accountable, as in Waltman, for conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice under subsection (5) of the
rule or for conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law
under subsection (6). The three-judge panel had recommended a
reprimand but the Chief Judge favored six-months suspension.
The holding in the majority opinon that violations of subsections
(5) and (6) of the rule were not sufficiently alleged by the
Commission to satisfy Ruffalo will' do little to advance the
consignment of that peculiar case to the state of oblivion where it so
clearly belongs. It may be noted, however, that the discerning
analyses of "moral turpitude" in Brewster and Waltman, both
unanimous on this point, are healthy developments. They may
indicate a trend away from some of the earlier cases discussed in the
foregoing article whereunder any conduct deemed offensive to a trier
of law might be tossed into the grab-bag of "moral turpitude." Under
the expanded range of santionable offenses now set forth in DR
1-102(A) this approach may no longer be the only alternative to
dismissal of the petition, assuming, of course, that charges of the
140. BV No. 7 (Ct. App., filed June 21, 1977).
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lesser offenses are sufficiently alleged and proven to satisfy the
respondent's constitutional rights.
A.W.M., Jr.
July 10, 1977.
